

**Prepared Statement of**

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**before the**

**United States House of Representatives  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights  
and  
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade**

**on**

**“Assessing the Consequences of the Failed State of Somalia”**

**Thursday, July 7, 2011**

**12:30 p.m.**

**Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2212  
Washington, D.C.**

Chairman Smith, Chairman Royce, Ranking Members Payne and Sherman, Distinguished Members of the Subcommittees:

I would like to thank you very much for the invitation to appear before you today to contribute to your assessment of the consequences of the failed state of Somalia in general and, in particular, the policy of the United States towards the challenges that arise thereof.

As we meet, the situation in Somalia has reached a critical juncture. Two decades after the collapse of the last entity that can be plausibly described as “the government of Somalia” and no fewer than fourteen failed attempts to reconstitute such a centralized authority later, the country is still fragmented into multiple fiefdoms. The current “Transitional Federal

Government” (TFG) is limping towards the August 20 expiration of its already extended mandate with little indication that it has made any positive progress since the time I testified here two years ago that it was “not a government by any common-sense definition of the term: it is entirely dependent on foreign troops...to protect its small enclave in Mogadishu, but otherwise administers no territory; even within this restricted zone, it has shown no functional capacity to govern, much less provide even minimal services to its citizens.” While Islamist insurgency spearheaded by the al-Qaeda-linked *Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen* (“Movement of Warrior Youth,” al-Shabaab) has suffered a series of setbacks at the hands of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)—to say nothing of recently increased strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles, presumably operated or at least coordinated by U.S. forces—it is far from defeated. Moreover, even allowing for the most optimistic interpretation of recent gains by the Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers fighting in Mogadishu, the fact remains that their commanders claim to have secured barely half of the sixteen districts of the city and the area under their effective control today remains smaller than that which the departing Ethiopian forces relinquished to them just two years ago. Finally, with the fate of Yemen still very much undetermined, there is the specter of the already existent links between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) expanding and proving an even greater threat to regional and international security, to say nothing about the increasing threat posed by maritime piracy in the waters of the Gulf of Aden between the two countries and beyond.

Unfortunately, compounding its poor political and military prospects, Somalia currently also faces environmental challenges which only exacerbate the former. The failure of the May-June rains for the second year in a row in some areas are creating conditions that the largest Somali nongovernmental organization, SAACID, in a statement issued just this week, has qualified as “famine.” Beyond the humanitarian tragedy, the movement of clans which have lost between 80 and 100 percent of their herds in search of food and income in Mogadishu and other urban centers leaves entire Middle Shabelle districts like Adale and Raghe Elle to al-Shabaab.<sup>1</sup> The estimate released by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) just two days ago that one-fourth of the total Somalia’s 7.5 million people have been driven from their homes by drought or violence to either centers within the country or refugee camps in neighboring states is even more dire when one considers that those displaced come almost exclusively from southern and central areas where the total population is actually less than half the figure cited by the refugee agency.

In this context, I would like to make five main points, before considering to U.S. policy:

1. Rather than a solution to the challenge of state failure in Somalia, the TFG has clearly shown itself to be part of the problem—in fact, a rather significant factor in the ongoing crisis.

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<sup>1</sup> SAACID is also reporting a mass movement of families from Dinsoor District in Bay Region, and Qoryoley and Kurtun Warrey Districts in Lower Shabelle Region, to Mogadishu in search of food and employment, due to a loss of herds, crops and water in their home districts.

2. AMISOM is neither sustainable as military operation nor viable as a strategy. Whatever short-term advantages the presence of the African Union force provides are more than offset by the long-term complications it causes, both in Somalia and for regional politics.
3. The resilience of al-Shabaab and other insurgent forces should not be underestimated, especially when the TFG and AMISOM continually fuel the fires of local discontent.
4. The process of devolution in the onetime Somali state continues inexorably and represents a trend which, after more than twenty years, has become irreversible.
5. A new approach is desperately needed if the worst consequences of Somalia's state failure are to be at least mitigated.

### **Somalia's Dysfunctional TFG**

Given all the diplomatic and political support they has enjoyed in recent years as well as the resources expended on training a Somali security force—to say nothing of the Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers who have given their lives to defend them when most of them have lacked the commitment to put their own lives or those of their sons on the line—the utter failure of TFG head Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and his ministers to extend the interim regime's writ beyond the grounds of Villa Somalia, the presidential compound in Mogadishu, is inexcusable. A report earlier this year by the International Crisis Group succinctly summarizes the sad state of affairs when it concluded that the TFG “has squandered the goodwill and support it received and achieved little of significance in the two years it has been in office. It is inept, increasingly corrupt and hobbled by President Sharif's weak leadership. So far, every effort to make the administration modestly functional has come unstuck.” And all this was before the quarrel between the TFG president and the parliamentary speaker, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, broke into the open, only to be patched up, at least for the moment, when both men agreed to award themselves another year in office—by what legal authority no one knows—as well as to oust Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, a.k.a. Farmajo, to avoid having to continue sharing spoils with him.

Moreover, what we are confronting is not just political incompetence, but outright criminality. Last year the United Nations Security Council's Sanctions Monitoring Group for Somalia exhaustively documented how senior TFG officials, including the deputy prime minister and other members of the cabinet, were directly involved in visa fraud including, in one incident, the facilitation of travel to Europe by two suspected al-Shabaab cadres. More recently, the report of the auditors reviewing the TFG's books for the years 2009 and 2010 reveals that while during the relevant period bilateral assistance to the regime totaled \$75,600,000, only \$2,875,000 could be accounted for. The auditors determined that the balance, which

represents more than 96 percent of international aid to the TFG, was simply “stolen” and specifically recommended forensic investigations of the Office of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Telecommunications, as the most egregious offenders.

As to recently ousted Prime Minister Farmajo, the spin put out by the public relations firms he hired with international donor assistance notwithstanding, he was no reformer. When political commentators said he came with “no political baggage,” it was a polite way of saying that he had no experience of Somali politics on the ground—he had not been in the country for a quarter of a century at the time of his appointment—and no base from which to lead. That is not to say that he did not learn quickly from his colleagues in the TFG. He held the post less than a year, but the auditors could not account for \$648,000 from the salary account of the Office of the Prime Minister. He also awarded his old boss, a former county executive from upstate New York with no evident foreign policy credentials, to lobby the U.S. State Department on his behalf. Given that Farmajo is a U.S. citizen and at least some of the “missing” or otherwise misspent funds undoubtedly derive from assistance funded by American taxpayers, perhaps the Department of Justice could be encouraged by the Subcommittees to take a closer look into the matter and determine whether any laws have been broken and, if so, what civil remedies might be sought or criminal prosecutions possibly brought.

Anyway, is it any surprise that such an outfit has had little success in rallying even minimal public support behind it, much less accomplishing any of the basic tasks—the fulfillment of which was the very *raison d’être* for its creation in the first place—including laying the reaching out to various segments of society, drafting a permanent constitution, conducting a census, holding elections, and, in general, reestablishing the foundations for Somali statehood?

There is perhaps no more telling indicator of the TFG’s dismal prospects than the fact that no fewer than three different Western initiatives—a United States-funded training program using private contractors, a European Union military mission, and a French operation—have recruited, trained, and armed more than 9,000 troops for the TFG and yet fewer than 1,000 of these recruits have remained loyal to the regime. To make matters worse, some of the personnel have gone over to the insurgents, taking with them invaluable tactical knowledge as well as their weapons.

### **The Challenge of AMISOM**

To its credit and that of its international partners like the United States, AMISOM is certainly in much better shape than it has been at any other time in its more than four years of existence. Recently, at not insignificant sacrifice, AMISOM has managed to extend its operational reach enough for the force commander, Ugandan Major General Nathan Mugisha, to announce that it

is now present in thirteen of Mogadishu's sixteen districts, although he acknowledged that it soldiers "dominate" in just "more than half of these."

Nonetheless, AMISOM remains limited in which it can accomplish by lack of manpower and materiel. It took four years for the force to reach its original authorized strength of 8,000 peacekeepers. And while additional deployments from Burundi and Uganda have brought the current troop strength up to just over 9,000, there is no indication of where personnel will be found to bring the numbers up to the new ceiling of 12,000 authorized by the UN Security Council in December 2010. Even if the troops are raised and the international community, acting through the UN, the AU, or the subregional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), was to actually adequately equip the enlarged force, it would still be beyond delusional to think that a 12,000-strong contingent—or even the 20,000-strong force some blowhards at the AU summit last weekend were talking about—would succeed where the infinitely more robust and better trained and armed UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces, with their 37,000 and 28,000 personnel respectively, failed so miserably just a decade and a half ago against a far less capable opposition than the current Islamist insurgents.

If one looks at a successful model of counterinsurgency, the "surge" in Iraq during 2006 and 2007, the United States committed more than 160,000 troops to Iraq, backed by a further 100,000 service men and women deployed elsewhere in the region to provide rear support. This translates into one pair of boots on the ground for every 187 Iraqis. AMISOM, in contrast, is tasked with doing much the same job with one soldier for every 500 Somalis—and this if it limits its ambitions to just southern and central Somalia.

AMISOM's problem is, unfortunately, an all-too-familiar one: Its political architects gave very little thought as to what they hoped to achieve in Somalia, how they intended to do so, and what their exit strategy might be. Instead, what we have is nothing more than a charade whereby the international community pretends to be doing something while it really does very little, all the while throwing increasing, but nonetheless inadequate, numbers of African soldiers into a conflict that they cannot hope to "win." One of few things, aside from their noxious ideology, that unites the various Shabaab factions among themselves, is opposition to the TFG and its AMISOM protectors. The opposition to the presence of the AU force is one of the few advantages that al-Shabaab has to rally support from a Somali populace that otherwise has little time for its alien strictures, the ham-fisted tactics which AMISOM has often adopted in response to attacks by the insurgents having fanned the long-smoldering Somali resentment of the foreign intervention into veritable flames.

One might also observe that our reliance on AMISOM causes difficulties for our policy objectives elsewhere in Africa. Take for example the lamentably ham-fisted way in which the regime in Uganda has dealt with political opponents in recent months. President Yoweri Museveni knows that as long the international community continues to back the corrupt and ineffective TFG, it will be constrained insofar as bringing any meaningful pressure on him, since

the soldiers of the Uganda People's Defence Force are ultimately all that stand between the TFG and its inevitable fate.

### **Al-Shabaab's Resilience**

Despite the setbacks they have suffered in recent months, unlike the TFG, the insurgents opposing it have proven to be rather flexible and well adapted to the type of campaign they are fighting.

In the aftermath of its losses in last year's Ramadan offensive, al-Shabaab reshuffled its leadership with Ibrahim Haji Jama, a.k.a. al-Afghani, a militant who trained and fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir before returning to Somalia, emerging as nominal leader of the group. More significantly, al-Shabaab has apparently formally adopted a decentralized system whereby various leaders have assumed command in their home areas, where they are most likely to garner support from fellow clansmen: the erstwhile emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane, a.k.a. Mukhtar Abu Zubair, has assumed control of operations in Somaliland; Fuad Mohamed Qalaf "Shongole" is in charge in Puntland; Mukhtar Robow Ali, a.k.a. Abu Mansur, in the Bay and Bakool regions of southern Somalia; Hassan Abdullah Hersi "al-Turki" continues to hold sway over the Middle and Lower Jubba Valley with his *Mu'askar Ras Kamboni* ("Ras Kamboni Brigades") now more integrated into the al-Shabaab organization; and Ali Mohamed Raghe "Dheere" doing the same in Mogadishu with the assistance of the Comoros-born al-Qaeda in East Africa chief Fazul Abdullah Mohammed until the latter was slain last month. Having been forced at the very end of last year to fold his *Hizbul Islam* ("Islamic Party") into al-Shabaab, Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys has been given command of the insurgency in his native Hiiraan region in central Somalia. It should be recalled Hizbul Islam's primary difference with al-Shabaab was in emphasis, rather than ideology, its two principal demands being focused on the implementation of a strict version of *shari'a* as the law in Somalia and withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country, rather than a more global jihadist agenda.

The shuffle in the extremist group's leadership as well as what appears to be a heightened campaign of drone attacks by U.S. counterterrorism forces may well have the effect of advancing more nationalist elements within the Islamist insurgency, thus rendering it actually more attractive to Somalis, both in Somalia and in the diaspora.

If I may be permitted a word about al-Shabaab and its place among international terrorist networks as there is not inconsiderable confusion and misinformation apropos. In March 2008, the U.S. State Department formally designated al-Shabaab an international terrorist organization. Three months later, then-Shabaab leader Godane responded by praising Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri—implying that the group had become part of al-Qaeda—and explicitly declaring al-Shabaab's intention to attack the United States. Four months later, al Shabaab released a video that pledging loyalty to al Qaeda and urged young Muslims to

join its cause. The following year, al-Shabaab released a video entitled *At Your Service, O Osama*, renewing its pledge of allegiance to bin Laden. Similarly, last year al-Shabaab's leaders issued a statement that linked their fight in the Horn of Africa to al-Qaeda's global jihad led by bin Laden.

Al-Qaeda has likewise been signaling its support for the al-Shabaab since at least June 2008, when a 19-minute video from one of its most senior commanders, Abu Yahya al-Libi, formally commended al-Shabaab and its cause to Somalis. During 2009, all three top leaders of al-Qaeda issued statements praising al-Shabaab's actions in Somalia, even going so far as to elevate them to the same level as the jihads in Afghanistan and Iraq. While Osama bin Laden released only five statements that entire year, he nonetheless devoted one of them entirely to Somalia, heralding al-Shabaab as "one of the most important armies in the Mujahid Islamic battalion, and are the first line of defense for the Islamic world in its southwest part" and declaring that "the war which has been taking place on your soil is a war between Islam and the international Crusade."

Despite these statements, however, most analysts do not believe that al-Shabaab is quite yet a branch of, much less under the operational control of al-Qaeda. However, most acknowledge—as does the most recent edition of the U.S. State Department's Congressionally mandated *Country Reports on Terrorism*—that there are many links between the two organizations. Certainly there is evidence dating back to at least 2007 of operational links—including transfers of knowledge and equipment—between al-Shabaab in Somalia and what eventually emerged as AQAP in Yemen. Those same links seem to be at work in the case of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a mid-level al-Shabaab militant captured by U.S. forces several months ago as he was shuttling between Somalia and Yemen, whose nine-count indictment on terrorism charges by a grand jury in the U.S. Federal Court of the Southern District of New York was unsealed on Tuesday; the evidence obtained from his questioning by the High-Value Interrogation Group are said to provide some of the clearest evidence to date of deepening relationship between al-Shabaab and AQAP. And while, unlike the other major group of violent Islamist extremists in Africa, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab was never formally admitted as a branch of al-Qaeda during Osama bin Laden's lifetime, that may well change as his successors seek to establish a name for themselves by carrying out attacks wherever they can, but especially in the West.

Whatever its shortcomings as an organization and its seeming endless internecine strife, al-Shabaab has developed an effective media recruitment program that has been rather successful in reaching the large Somali diaspora in Europe, North America, the Middle East, Africa, and Australia. While the number of Somali recruits is tiny compared to the estimated two million Somalis in the diaspora, the relative success of the recruitment program has focused considerable international attention, by both terrorist networks and law enforcement



officials, on al-Shabaab's potential capabilities, especially the reach the extremist group clearly enjoys into diaspora communities, including those in the United States.<sup>2</sup>

## **Somalia's Inexorable Devolution**

If there is a silver lining at all in this otherwise dismal landscape, it is the realization that just because the TFG under Sharif Ahmed is in even more disarray than it was under his irascible predecessor, the Darod warlord Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, does not mean that there is a complete absence of political progress among the Somali. Quite to the contrary, Somalis have been quite busy building alternatives to the faction-ridden, questionably legitimate, and generally useless "national government" that is still, perplexingly, the international community's preferred interlocutor with its fractious and corrupt denizens treated as if they were somehow statesmen, rather than the parasites their own auditors declare them to be.

The peaceful presidential election in the northwest region of Somaliland, a poll which international observers acknowledged met global standards, and the subsequent orderly transition to a new administration under President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud "Silanyo" further enhanced the territory's claim for international recognition of its *de facto* independence. The independence of South Sudan just two days from now further undercuts whatever "logic" argues against acknowledgment of Somalilanders' exercise of self-determination.

It is worth emphasizing that while Somaliland's appeal for diplomatic recognition is addressed to the international community, it is founded upon an internal legitimacy that has utterly eluded the TFG. In the two decades since its leaders reclaimed the sovereignty that Somaliland enjoyed before its disastrous union with *Somalia Italiana*, the northern region's successful demobilization of former fighters, formation of national defense and security services, and the extraordinary resettlement of over one million refugees and internally displaced persons fostered the internal consolidation of its nascent polity. The establishment of independent newspapers, radio stations, and a host of local NGOs and other civic organizations reinforced the nation-building exercise. The stable environment thus facilitated substantial investments by both local and diaspora businessmen who built, among other things, a telecommunications infrastructure more developed than existent in some of Somaliland's neighbors. Just last month, Coca-Cola announced the opening of a bottling plant in the region.

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<sup>2</sup> While there is considerable disagreement among analysts as to the scope and nature of operational links between al-Shabaab and Somali pirates or if such even exist, there is also increasing agreement that at least some of the ransoms paid to the latter are being transmitted to the former in the form of a "tax" for license to operate in areas under the control of the Islamist group. According to a Reuters investigation at least tacitly endorsed by officials with the office of the United Nations special envoy for Somalia and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), between February and May of this year, al-Shabaab's "marine office" in Xarardheere received some \$1,146,000 from ransoms paid for six hijacked vessels.



Unlike quite a number of African regimes, the government of Somaliland actually collects taxes from its citizens, discovering in the process that it can actually increase revenue by more than halving sales and income taxes (from 12 to 5 percent and from as much as 25 to 10 percent, respectively). The World Bank is currently training tax officials and USAID recently agreed to build ten inland revenue centers across the region. And the funds raised have been spent in a manner that could hardly be more transparent: the introduction last year of universal free primary and intermediate schooling through the elimination of the hitherto parent fees.

In this context, given both the chaos and violence that characterize southern and central Somalia and the demographic reality that the majority of the more than three million Somalilanders were born after the region declared its resumed independence and have never thought of themselves as citizens of a unitary Somalia, can anyone imagine a scenario where it would be possible to peaceably reincorporate them into such a state? And why would the international community even want that to happen, given that Somaliland has not only kept its 740-kilometer coastline largely free of piracy, but has also even been deemed secure enough that, in December 2009, the Obama administration transferred two Somali detainees from Guantanamo there rather than risk sending them to the insecure conditions presided over by the TFG in Mogadishu. (See the report from a distinguished group of Africanists assembled by the South Africa-based Brenthurst Foundation, of which I had the privileged to be a part, and which I have attached as an addendum.)

While the northeastern region Puntland is still formally committed to being a part of a future federal Somalia, its people have continued to edge closer to abandoning altogether the shipwreck that is the Somali ship of state. It has been over a year since the regional parliament voted unanimously to adopt a distinctive flag, coat of arms, and anthem. While the region has its share of problems—and is itself a not insignificant problem for the international community insofar as it is the epicenter of Somali piracy activities which in recent years not only garnered record ransoms, but also expanded operations into unprecedented areas to the east and south—it is nonetheless understandable that Puntland's citizens are frustrated with the utter failure of the Mogadishu-based TFG to provide them with security or any other goods or services. As to the piracy rampant on the region's coasts, it is hard to conceive of how that problem can be resolved without some international engagement with Puntland authorities.

Other areas in the territory of the former Somali state are likewise moving along the same centrifugal trajectory. In the central regions of Galguduud and Mudug, for example, the local residents set up several years ago what they have dubbed the "Galmudug State." Last year, they elected a veteran of the old Somali military, Colonel Mohamed Ahmed Alin, to a three-year term as the second president of what describes itself as "a secular, decentralized state." A similar process is taking place in Jubbaland along the frontier with Kenya, apparently with the backing of the latter, which wants a buffer between it and the Islamist insurgency. Last year local clans in the region began forming a secular administration of their own. In April 2011, it was announced that the new autonomous authority of "Azania" had been inaugurated with the

TFG's own defense minister, Mohamed Abdi Mohamed "Gandhi," as its first president. Just this past weekend came news of another self-declared administration, "Himan Iyo Heb," established by Habar Gidir clansmen in central Somalia, north of Mogadishu. There are similar stirrings among the Hawiye in the Benadir region around Mogadishu and among the Digil/Rahanweyn clans farther south.

Without necessarily precluding an eventual confederal arrangement of some sort, it seems a foregone conclusion to all but the willfully blind that political momentum among the Somali is moving overwhelmingly in the direction of multiple divisions and that, except for those elites who have figured out how to extract rents from the status quo, the heavily centralized, "top-down" arrangement exemplified by the TFG has been almost universally rejected by Somalis across the gamut of the nation's clan, geographical, and political spectra.

### **The Need for a New Approach**

The general assumption of most policymakers and analysts is that the state, possessor of the Weberian monopoly on legitimate violence, is the best instrument in the toolkit of international relations for preserving peace and, hence, when peace is lacking, the best response is to reinforce or even recreate the state. While this is undoubtedly true in many cases, there are those, like Somalia, in which state-building efforts actually fuel conflict, given the deficit in the political legitimacy of the interim regime or central government. Instead of enhancing peace, it serves as a prize over which rivals contend.

If the failure so far of no fewer than fourteen internationally-backed attempts at establishing a national government and the uncertainty surrounding the current fifteenth such effort indicate anything, it is the futility of the notion that outsiders can impose a regime on Somalia.

A more viable course than the one hitherto adopted by the international community will be the one that, by adapting to the decentralized nature of Somali social reality and privileging the "bottom-up" approach, is better suited to buy Somalis themselves the time and space within which to make their own determinations about their future political arrangements while at the same time flexible enough to allow their neighbors and the rest of the international community the ability to protect their legitimate security interests. Supporting governance at the level where it is accountable and legitimate—whether in the context of the nascent states like Somaliland and Puntland in the northern regions or in the emergent polities, local communities and civil society structures in parts of the south—is the most effective and efficient means of both managing the crises and countering the security threats that have arisen in the wake of the collapse of the Somali state.

## Whither U.S. Policy?

Encouragingly, there have been indications that various parts of the international community may finally be coming, however reluctantly, to this same conclusion. Last fall, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, announced a “second-track strategy” that would supplement America’s hitherto policy of virtually unconditional—and, quite frankly, at times poorly-informed—support for the TFG. The new approach included greater formal engagement with government officials from Somaliland and Puntland with an eye to “looking for ways to strengthen their capacity both to govern and to deliver services to their people.” America’s top Africa diplomat acknowledged both that Somaliland and Puntland were “zones of relative political and civil stability,” and that “they will, in fact, be a bulwark against extremism and radicalism that might emerge from the south.” Significantly, he also held out the prospect of dealings with other forces in Somalia and delinked them from the feckless TFG:

Equally as a part of the second-track strategy, we are going to reach out to groups in south central Somalia, groups in local governments, clans, and sub-clans that are opposed to Al-Shabaab, the radical extremist group in the south, but are not allied formally or directly with the TFG. And we will look for opportunities to work with these groups to see if we can identify them, find ways of supporting their development initiatives and activities.

Shortly after Secretary Carson announced the “second-track strategy,” his example was followed by the African Union. After long refusing to even acknowledge their existence, the pan-African organization’s Peace and Security Council directed AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping to “broaden consultations with Somaliland and Puntland as part of the overall efforts to promote stability and further peace and reconciliation in Somalia.”

While the new U.S. policy has yet to be fully worked out, it nonetheless represents a dramatic and long-overdue shift for which the administration deserves credit. The challenge now is to be equally creative in developing the appropriate vehicles for political, economic, and security engagement with the appropriate Somali partners. The forthcoming posting of Ambassador James Swan to Nairobi as the coordinator for U.S. efforts on Somalia ought to be the occasion for a thorough review of our policy, its implementation, and the consequences thereof. Certainly, if pragmatism counsels that we must endure another year of the TFG existence for want of a ready alternative, then by all means let us ensure that this final year is exactly that and avail ourselves of the time to carefully consider alternative paths for achieving what the Somali people deserve and our security interests demand.

## Conclusion


The disheartening failure of no fewer than fourteen different internationally backed attempts to reestablish a national government in Somalia, along with the diminishing legitimacy of the TFG and increasingly untenable nature of its current strategic position underscores the need for the international community in general and the United States in particular to confront the consequences of that spectacular case of ongoing state failure. After two decades, the cost of the refusal to forthrightly face the realities of the situation, whether willful or unconscious, has to be measured not only in billions of dollars in wasted aid and the costs exacted by war and piracy, but, tragically, in countless lost and shattered lives.

It is high time that the United States and Somalia's other international partners look after their own legitimate interests and refocus their energies on minimizing and containing the harm caused by the TFG's incompetence and corruption, while strengthening those functional parts of the former Somali state and integrating them into the framework for regional security and stability. To put it in terms that would resonate with the traditional pastoral Somali, the stakes are simply too high for us to continue betting on a camel that, if not quite dead, is certainly crippled.

**United States House of Representatives  
Committee on Foreign Affairs**

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Clause 2(g) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives and the Rules of the Committee require the disclosure of the following information. A copy of this form should be attached to your written testimony and will be made publicly available in electronic format, per House Rules.

<b>1. Name:</b>  Dr. J. Peter Pham	<b>2. Organization or organizations you are representing:</b>  Atlantic Council of the United States
<b>3. Date of Committee hearing:</b>  July 7, 2011	
<b>4. Have <u>you</u> received any Federal grants or contracts (including any subgrants and subcontracts) since October 1, 2008 related to the subject on which you have been invited to testify?</b>  <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<b>5. Have any of the <u>organizations you are representing</u> received any Federal grants or contracts (including any subgrants and subcontracts) since October 1, 2008 related to the subject on which you have been invited to testify?</b>  <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<b>6. If you answered yes to either item 4 or 5, please list the source and amount of each grant or contract, and indicate whether the recipient of such grant was you or the organization(s) you are representing. You may list additional grants or contracts on additional sheets.</b>          	
<b>7. Signature:</b>  	

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